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By
F. Reed Dickerson
Should plain English be legislated?
My short answer is no; but, on
second thought and with reserva-
tions, yes. Maybe I should enlarge on
that.
It is hard to say when the com-
plaints against lawyers' language
began. Although hardly the first,
Jeremy Bentham was fuming about
legislative long-windedness in 1843.1
Professor Fred Rodell, writing in 1939,
said, "Almost all legal sentences ...
have a way of reading as though they
had been translated from theGerman
by someone with a rather meager
knowledge of English."2 Two years
later someone observed that statutes
were being spoken of as "disgraceful,
unworkmanlike, defective, unin-
telligible, abounding in errors, ill-
penned, inadequate, loosely-
worded, depraved in style, [full of]
peculiar absurdities, mischievous,
baneful in influence . . . confusing,
obscure, . . . overbulky, redundant,
entangled, unsteady, disorderly,
complex, to say nothing of being
'uncognoscible.' "3
The modern push for clear
regulations began in the early 40's,
following Congressman Maury
Maverick's coinage of "gobbledy-
gook" and the Office of Price Ad-
ministration's first attempts to impose
price controls. Finding that America's
small businessmen could not under-
stand its regulations without the
intervention of a lawyer, OPA
engaged Rudolf Flesch and Professor
David F. Cavers of the Harvard Law
School to help the agency communi-
cate more effectively with the people
whose prices it regulated.
From OPA's experience came a
body of expertise in simplifying laws
that remains useful even today. Un-
fortunately, the movement to
simplify faded with the war pressures
that supported price control. The re-
sulting passivity went undisturbed,
even by the Korean and Vietnamese
wars, until the explosion of the
consumer movement, which recently
turned its attention to documents
that the typical consumers of goods
and services are being persuaded to
accept: insurance policies, product
warranties, and credit documents. At
the same time, unsophisticated
businessmen were being subjected to
a barrage of detailed regulations from
agencies such as the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration and
the Environmental Protection
Agency. As a result, public pressure to
simplify legal instruments is greater
today than it was even during World
War II.
How do we solve the problem?
First, we have to understand it. This
involves, among other things,
knowing how lawyers got into this
mess. The traditional explanation, of
course, has been that every discipline
needs its own technical terms, some
of which may be meaningless to out-
siders. Also, the law often deals with
matters that are inherently compli-
cated. Both statements are true. It is
also true that many special legal terms
have perfectly adequate plain-English
equivalents and some matters need
not be as complicated as they at first
seem. Here, a good case for simplifi-
cation can be made.
Another explanation is that much
of traditional law language is
traceable to the time when it was
necessary to take account of, not only
Anglo-Saxon, but Norman French,
Old Norse, Celtic, and Latin.4This was
the reason, for instance, for using
couplets like "null and void," which
say the same thing in different
languages, but for which a need no
longer exists.
Another explanation is that, so long
as courts remained unfriendly to
legislative changes in the common
law, a draftsman had good reason to
sprinkle his text with synonyms to
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guide judges who responded only to
special incantations. Here, too, the
need has, for the most part,
disappeared.
Still another explanation is that
lawyers have been enmeshed in a
network of outworn forms that they
have been reluctant to revise if the
forms have been adjudicated in
court, and unable to revise if they do
not understand them which is often
the case. A thorough purging of
offending forms would be a happy
event.
But do we need a law?
The idea of legislating the specifics
of good writing is highly repugnant to
me and not merely because most of
the people who have been writing
these laws have failed to get an
adequate handle on the principles of
clear communication. There is also
the desirabilityof not tying the hands
of draftsmen who need elbow room.
Even so, a modest case can be made
for some kind of law to help the legal
profession overcome its present,
partly justifiable inertia. Without it,
the organized bar is unlikely to
initiate effective action to improve
the clarity of statutes, regulations, or
6ther legal instruments.
To put it inelegantly, the organized
bar needs a solid legislative jolt. The
same is true of the law schools. I am
also persuaded that this can be done
without seriously compromising the
principles of good draftsmanship.
Because we already know how to
simplify legal documents, it is high
time that we get moving. Unfortun-
ately, I have, at this moment, only a
general notion of what belongs in
such a legislative mandate.
The first efforts to legislate "plain
language" show widely differing
approaches. New York's Sullivan laws
protects "consumer" documents,
Which are residential leases or
contracts for money, property, or
services for "personal, family, or
household purposes" and involve
$50,000 or less. The mandated
standard is "plain language," de-
fined as language "written in a clear
and coherent manner using words
with common and every day
meanings." In case of non-compli-
ance, the consumer is entitled to
actual damages and a civil penalty of
$50, but not attorneys' fees or court
costs. Defenses include good faith
and full performance. The Attorney
General may bring an action for an in-
junction or restitution.
Massachusetts' plain language law 6
applies only to insurance policies.
There is no money limit and the
standards require (1) scoring at least
50 on the Flesch (or equivalent) read-
ability test, applied according to
detailed statutory instructions, and (2)
meeting type-face standards,
avoiding undue prominence of parti-
cular provisions, including a table of
contents or subject index, maintain-
ing appropriate margins and ink-to-
paper contrast, and providing an
organization and summary "con-
ducive to understandability."
Compliance is required only to
obtain clearance from the insurance
commissioner.
Connecticut's law 7 requires "plain
language" for the same general kinds
of consumer contracts as New York's
law protects, but only those involv-
ing up to $25,000. Again, the standard
is "plain language," except that it is
tied to two alternative sets of supple-
mentary standards. The first has 9
criteria such as length of sentences,
typography, verb forms, and
captions. The second has 11 criteria
such as words-per-sentence,
syllables-per-word, length of para-
graphs, and space between para-
graphs. There are elaborate instruc-
tions for counting words and
determining what is a "sentence" or
"syllable." Offended consumers may
recover a civil penalty of $100 plus
attorneys' fees. Defenses include
good faith, preparation of the
contract by the consumer,
attendance by plaintiff's attorney at
its signing, full performance, and the
expiration of six years.
Maine's plain language insurance
lawe generally follows the Massa-
chusetts pattern. Its plain language
F. Reed Dickerson, Bloomington, has been a law
professor at Indiana University School of Law-
Bloomington since 1958, and also served as assis-
tant dean from 1971-75. He received his LL.B. In
1934 from Harvard, also, LL.M. In 1939 from Colum-
bia University, and J.S.D. In 1950. Prof. Dickerson Is
a member of the Indiana State Bar Association.
This article is an edited and slightly expanded
version of remarks made at the conference on "Plain
English In a Complex Society," Indianapolis,
October 13, 1979.
consumer loan law 9 covers "loans
made to a consumer by a supervised
lender for personal, family or house-
hold purposes, if the debt is payable
in installments or a finance charge is
made," unless the amount involved
exceeds $100,000. Each such
consumer loan contract must be in
"plain language," defined as"written
in a clear and coherent manner using
words with common and every day
meanings." It must also have a
"[m]eaningful arrangement," de-
fined as "[a]ppropriately divided and
captioned by its various sections."
Non-compliance is subject to legal
action by the superintendent of the
Bureau of Consumer Protection.
However, a supervised lender may
gain immunity from suit by securing
the Bureau's certificate of
compliance.
One trouble is that the "plain
English" ideal, if not defined, is a bit
off the mark. For one thing, "plain
English" is in many legal contexts any-
thing but plain. Besides, the concept
suggests that there is an ideal way to
(continued on next page)
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say things that will fit all legal
audiences.
Because legal audiences differ, the
draftsman should be able to adjust his
focus accordingly. On the other
hand, no great harm is involved if
such a law focuses solely on pro-
fessionals who deal with unsophisti-
cated consumers, where a Reader's
Digest level of understandability, as
measured for example by the Flesch
readability test, makes some sense.
On the other hand, it makes less sense
if the effort is spread over a wider
base within which audiences
materially differ.
Remember, too, that readability is
not the same as substantive clarity. A
document can meet the Flesch or
Gunning test 100 percent without
rising above pure gibberish. What we
should shoot for here is a general per-
formance standard of decently
readable substantive clarity (as
adopted by New York's Sullivan law
and Maine's law on consumer loan
agreements) bolstered, perhaps, by
suggested specifics to be taken into
account (such as type face, para-
graphing, and cross-referencing),
without mandating a myriad of detail
(as in Connecticut's plain language
law). As for "simplicity," we should
seek only a simplicity that does no
material violence to the substantive
values that inhere in the subject
matter.
Moreover, any approach to clarity
that is tied only to language misses at
least two important aspects of the
problem. Functional clarity depends
not only on clarity of language but
also on clarity of concept and clarity
of organization. There may also be a
fourth: clarity of context. Successful
communication necessarily takes
account of external context, which is
the part of any communication that is
already in the minds of, or readily
accessible to, the legal audience. This
includes the many tacit assumptions,
not always readily determinable, that
color the meaning of the language
used. Here we are talking about the
normal workings of implication.
The main value of the plain English
laws I have seen appears to be sym-
bolic. Although New York's Sullivan
law is probably (in any serious sense)
unenforceable because of its "good
faith" defense (most bad draftsmen
operate in good faith), the tangible
results that it has already produced in
that state are impressive.
Ultimately, good drafting will come
only with better law school educa-
tion. But, until we crack that nut,
"plain English" laws, which are in
effect in at least four states and pend-
ing in upwards of 30, may, if suitably
improved, be a useful temporary
expedient.
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